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SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN 
 
By Nuno Verdial 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis effects 
rippled through the financial system, banks and sovereign states. The crises 
exposed the most vulnerable economies and caused profound changes on how 
risk is assessed, including sovereign risk, raising sovereign bond yields spreads 
across the Eurozone. This dissertation analyzes these events, focusing on the 
Portuguese and Spanish case after providing an insight into the Eurozone. The 
change in the pricing of sovereign risk was assessed by performing an OLS/2SLS 
fixed effects panel analysis on a pool of Eurozone countries and a SUR regression 
with Portugal and Spain covering the period 1999:11 until 2019:6. Our main 
results show that the pricing of sovereign risk changed with the crisis and the 
“whatever it takes” speech of Mario Draghi. Specifically, markets pricing of the 
Eurozone credit risk, liquidity risk and the risk appetite increased after the crisis 
and it relaxed after Mario Draghi´s speech. We did not find evidence of pricing 
regime changes after the speech in the Portuguese and Spanish case.  
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SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN 
 
By Nuno Verdial 
 
Resumo 
 
 
Os efeitos da crise financeira  de 2007-2008 e da crise das dividas soberanas 
Europeias espalharam-se pelo sistema financeiro, os bancos e os estados 
soberanos. Estas crises expuseram as economias mais vulneráveis e causaram 
mudanças profundas na maneira como o risco é avaliado, incluindo o risco das 
dividas soberanas, aumentando o spread dos juros dos títulos de divida soberana. 
Esta dissertação analisa estes eventos, focando-se no caso Português e Espanhol 
depois de abordar a situação Europeia. A mudança do preço do risco soberano foi 
averiguada através de, uma análise em painel OLS/2SLS fixed effects num 
conjunto de países da Zona Euro e uma regressão SUR com Portugal e Espanha, 
ambas abrangendo o período entre 1999:11 até 2019:6. Os resultados mostram 
que o preço do risco soberano mudou com a crise e com o discurso “whatever it 
takes” de Mario Draghi. Nomeadamente, o preço atribuido ao risco de crédito, 
risco de liquidez e apetitite de risco da Zona Euro pelos mercados aumentou após 
as crises e diminui a seguir ao discurso de Mario Draghi. Não encontramos provas 
de mudanças no regime de preços após o discurso no caso Português e Espanhol. 
 
 
Palavras chave: Títulos de Divida Soberana, Spreads, Crises, Política 
Monetária Não Convencional,Portugal, Espanha 
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1-Introduction 
Financial and economic crisis are not new, they can be traced as far back 
as to the Roman Empire. The most recent one, the 2007 subprime crisis, ignited 
the fuel which gave rise to the global financial crisis of 2007 and later the 
European sovereign debt crisis. The latter would result in an increase in the yields 
of government debt of several European countries, compromising their ability to 
meet their financial obligations. This raised fears of default amid the financial 
markets, which would in turn raise these yields yet again, causing a spiral debt, 
or a self-fulfilling speculative attack for the affected countries. Coupled with the 
global economic recession at this period, this liquidity and sustainability problem 
reached dire levels; resulting in financial support programs in Ireland, Greece 
and Portugal. Up until the global financial crisis, the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) growth was consistent, the fiscal scenario was good, with limited deficits 
and debt levels rising gently (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013); the yields of sovereign 
bonds were converging to German values and were below 50 bps (Bernoth & 
Erdogan, 2010). It is of the utmost importance to understand what the drivers of 
this change were and why they changed with the crisis. This can contribute to 
more informed decisions regarding monetary and fiscal policies, making them 
more effective in preventing, shortening and decreasing the severity of such 
events. It is generally accepted in the literature that the factors that make up the 
yields of sovereign debt are a combination of international and country specific 
factors, which mirror the risk of the debt. The major and sudden increase in the 
yields spread cannot be explained only by the change in the macroeconomic 
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fundamentals; the pricing of risk can change across time (Afonso & Jalles, 2018; 
Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010).  
Due to the global and European crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
resorted to unconventional monetary policy to restore financial stability in 
Europe.  
The objective of the dissertation is to contribute to the existing literature 
by analyzing the Portuguese and Spanish case, this will be done by assessing how 
the price of sovereign risk changed and which fundamentals contributed the 
most. Our main results show that while the price of sovereign risk increased after 
the crisis and it has slightly reduced after the “whatever it takes” (WIT) speech of 
Mario Draghi, these changes were not of the same magnitude  and not all 
countries were affected equally, namely Portugal and Spain in which we did not 
find evidence of a price regime modification after Draghi´s speech. This study is 
organized as follows. Section 2 is the Literature review. Section 3 provides a brief 
description of the events from the Financial Crisis until the WIT, with a focus on 
Portugal and Spain. Section 4 describes the econometrics methodology used. 
Section 5 presents the data used and the results obtained from the analysis. 
Section 6 consists of a recap and the key findings. 
 
2-Literature review 
There is a substantial amount of literature regarding the determinants of 
sovereign risk.  Most of the literature follows one of the following measures in 
order to assess sovereign risk: government bond yield spreads (Ferrucci, 2003; 
Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; Hilscher & Nosbuch, 2010; Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010; 
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Edwards, 1984), government bond yields (Afonso & Silva, 2017), credit default 
swaps (CDS) spreads (Aizenman et al, 2011; Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013) or 
sovereign debt credit rating (Afonso et al., 2007; Cantor & Pecker, 1996).  
A key study by Edwards (1984) concluded that national macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as public debt, foreign reserves, current account balance and 
inflation were influential drivers for the government bond spreads. 
Another study worth pointing out, by Bernoth & Erdogan (2010), 
concluded that the impact of the domestic fiscal variables and the risk appetite 
on the yield spreads can shift substantially over time. Before the crisis the 
government deficit was largely ignored by the financial markets when pricing 
sovereign risk, while the debt/GDP ratio was relevant; after the sovereign debt 
crisis, markets also began to consider the government’s budget balance. 
One of the effects of the European crisis is a higher sensitivity to countries 
fundamentals relative to pre-crisis periods, what is called “wake-up call”, 
especially in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (Beirne & Fratzscher, 
2013).  
In a recent paper, Afonso & Silva (2017) analyzed the determinants of 
sovereign yields of Portugal and Ireland. The results show both Portuguese and 
Irish bond yields were influenced by the quarterly variation of the German bond 
yield and by financial integration (measured by cross holding of government 
bonds). Also noteworthy was the rise of the Portuguese sovereign yield during the 
Securities Markets Programme (SMP), which consists of ECB´s purchases of 
government bonds. While under the economic financial assistance programme 
(EFAP) the debt/GDP ratio and the 3-month Euribor (proxy for monetary policy 
stance) were also significant and positive determinants of the yields in Portugal 
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and Ireland; the debt/GDP ratio had a non-linear effect on the increase of the 
yields. 
 
3-The story so far 
3.1 The Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis of 2007 was triggered by a combination of multiple 
factors concerning governments, private banks, central banks and households. 
Perhaps the most important ones are bank governance problems, inadequate 
supervision and regulatory framework, expansionary monetary policy, increase 
in securitization and risk modelling problems. The interaction of these factors 
culminated in the U.S. subprime crisis. The low interest rates available made it 
easy to be granted a loan; nonetheless the banks were not properly considering 
the risk of the loans. Mortgage loans were securitized into asset backed securities 
(ABS) and could be even further processed into collateralized debt obligations 
(CDO). Through financial engineering, high risk mortgage loans were repacked 
by the financial system into AAA investment grade securities. 
This recipe proved to be disastrous, a real estate bubble was built on top of 
these factors, which eventually collapsed with the tightening of the monetary 
policy and with the increase in non-performing loans. U.S. banks suffered huge 
losses, this led some institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, to file for bankruptcy. 
Investor´s confidence was shaken, even the biggest financial institution could 
fall. This greatly hampered the banks’ ability to finance themselves, they could 
neither get the funding needed in the capital markets nor in the interbank market. 
The financial institutions found themselves with their balance sheet full of illiquid 
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and depreciated assets and without the ability to access their pre-crisis funding 
sources (Faeh et al, 2009) 
The impact was felt across the entire world due to the interconnections of 
the financial system, namely because the previously mentioned ABS and CDO 
were sold across the globe but also CDS. 
 
3.2-Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe 
The outlook on Europe was not better than in the U. S. The banks were also 
devasted by the financial crisis and the mistrust spillover crossed the Atlantic 
Ocean. As in the U.S, banks and the economy also suffered a liquidity crisis. To 
keep the banks afloat, the governments intervened in multiple ways, such as asset 
purchases, capital injections, asset guarantee and debt guarantee (Faeh et al, 
2009). This was done so as not to carry the risk of further destabilizing the 
economy and the financial system. Besides having to inject liquidity in the 
financial system, the European Union (EU) countries acting on accordance with 
the plan drawn by the European Commission, the European Economic Recovery 
Plan (EERP), enacted a fiscal stimulus programme.  
To mitigate the pernicious effects of the recession brought by the global 
crisis and to  avoid a downward spiral ”…that investment and consumer 
purchases will be put off, sparking a vicious cycle of falling demand, downsized 
business plans, reduced innovation, and job cuts” as described by the 
Commission of the European Communities (2008),  a series of counter cyclical 
macroeconomic measures led to governments increased spending with the 
purpose of breathing some air into the economy. This programme would put 
more pressure on the countries with the most fragile fiscal balances. 
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This plan´s aim was to avoid a deep recession, by increasing demand 
through a fiscal stimulus, amounting to €200 bn (1.5% of EU GDP); €170 bn 
should come from national governments budgets and €30 bn from the EU 
funding (Commission of the European Communities, 2008).  In April and June 
2009, the fiscal support amounted to 3.3% and 5% of the EU GDP respectively. 
In average, the fiscal balances and the debt/GDP in EU worsened, from -0.9% to 
-6.6% and 57.5% to 73.4% respectively between 2007 and 2009.  
Before the crisis, even with disparate macroeconomic and fiscal positions (Lane, 
2012), the markets were assuming a convergence of the Eurozone to the Germany 
economy and thus priced bonds equally (Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012), the 
spreads between German bonds and Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy 
were close to 0 (Lane, 2012) as it can be seen in Figure I. 
 
Figure I – 10-year government bond yield spreads versus Germany 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations 
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Between 2008-2012 rising bond yields of several EU government bonds, 
displayed the financial markets concern about their ability to keep up with their 
future debt obligations, (Falagiarda & Reitz, 2015); the spread versus the German 
bond would rise above 300 bps for Italy and Spain (Lane, 2012). The countries 
with the most fragile economies and lingering public finance sustainability issues 
were exposed, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Access to the capital 
markets would eventually be cut off for the first three countries due to spiking 
yields on their sovereign bonds. These yields reflected the risk, the apprehension 
and the risk aversion of the debt markets at the time. To keep up with their 
financial obligations and avoid a default, these countries would be assisted by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EU through an EFAP. 
With the advent of the financial crisis the ECB began a gradual reduction 
of the interest rates, until it reached an historical low of 0 on 2016. Due to the 
massive shock of the financial crisis and later the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB 
resorted to unconventional monetary policy to keep its objectives. 
 
3.3-Unconventional Monetary Policy 
The European Central Bank (ECB) main role is to ensure price stability but 
without prejudice contribute to the achievement of the economic objectives of the 
EU (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 2016), which are full employment and balanced economic growth 
(Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016). To comply with 
his mandate, the ECB possesses the following instruments (Jäger & Grigoriadis, 
2017; Pereira, 2016): 
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 Reserves – Banks must hold 1% of their liabilities as funds at their national 
central bank, this allows banks to react to short term changes in the money 
market; 
 Open Market Operations – Through these the ECB guides the interest 
rates and manages the liquidity in the market, the most important one is 
the main refinancing operation (MRO); 
 Standing facilities – the deposit and marginal lending facility, their 
purpose is to manage the overnight liquidity; by allowing overnight 
deposits at the ECB with a lower rate than the MRO and to grant overnight 
liquidity to banks from the ECB at a rate above the MRO respectively.  
 
When the standard mechanisms are not enough, the ECB can resort to 
unconventional monetary policy, as it did to address the financial and later the 
sovereign debt crisis. These measures were implemented to safeguard the 
stability of the financial system and to ensure the functioning of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism (Afonso & Sousa-Leite, 2019; Jäger & 
Grigoriadis, 2017; Pereira, 2016): 
 Forward guidance, by guiding the expectations of the interest rates via 
announcements; 
 Qualitative/credit easing, done by changing the ECB balance sheet 
composition; 
 Quantitative easing, which consists of increasing the ECB balance sheet 
size by buying securities in the secondary market (sovereign and corporate 
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bonds, asset backed securities) and refinancing operations at low interest 
rates, namely the Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations 
 Decrease to record lows the interest rates of MRO, standing and marginal 
lending facilities. 
 
3.4-Portugal 
From 1995 to 2001 Portugal experienced a boom, in anticipation for the 
participation in the Eurozone project; this currency union would decrease not 
only country and exchange rate risks but also inflation (Blanchard, 2007; 
Blanchard & Portugal, 2017). In result the nominal and real interest rates 
decreased substantially. At the time it was also believed it would trigger a faster 
convergence and higher growth. This resulted in increased investment and 
spending from the households and firms (Blanchard & Portugal, 2017; Lourtie, 
2011).In this period the economy grew on average 3.5% and the unemployment 
rate declined; while the deficit increased, and the current account balance 
worsened to a staggering -10%; the debt to GDP was barely affected, it was 
reduced from 58% to 53%. The budget deficit improved from -4.2% to -3.3%, 
while the cyclically adjusted primary deficit, which discounts the lower interest 
rates and the output growth (Blanchard, 2007), deteriorated from 1.5% to -2.6% 
(Blanchard & Portugal, 2017). 
The period from 2002 until 2007 was a slump, GDP growth stalled to an 
average measly 1.1%. Accompanying this was an increase in unemployment from 
5.5% to 8.7%. Private consumption growth decreased, and public spending 
bumped, partially to offset the former; still both were higher than the growth of 
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production (Correia, 2016), the cyclically adjusted deficit would increase to 3% 
(Blanchard & Portugal, 2017). The debt to GDP would climb up to 68.4% in 2007 
and the current account balance hovered around -10%. Blanchard & Portugal 
(2017) point a couple factors for this dismay economic status such as lower levels 
of remittances, the competition from the Central and Eastern European countries 
that joined the European Union and a decrease in competitiveness due to the 
increase of 4.3% of labour costs over the euro average. 
By 2008-2009 Portugal, as most of the developed world, was facing the 
consequences of the financial crisis, and stumbled into a recession; even though 
the effects were not as pronounced, the Portuguese economy shrank less than the 
euro zone in these years (Reis, 2013). Portuguese exports decreased by 10.2%, 
mainly due to a reduction of the output of the trading partners (Blanchard & 
Portugal, 2017); while imports decreased by 9.9% in 2009 (Correira, 2016). 
Banks’ ability to obtain funding through the capital markets was reduced (Caldas, 
2013) and the credit supply crunched due to an increase in the cost of funds, even 
with the ECB and Bank of Portugal liquidity provisions (Blanchard & Portugal, 
2017; Caldas, 2013). In this period two banks crumpled, BPN and BPP; the first 
was nationalized in November 2008 and the second went bankrupt in 2010.  
In 2008 the Portuguese government implemented the Initiative on 
Strengthening Financial Stability (IREF) with the measures outlined in the 
Appendix Table AI, to better equip and prepare the financial system to deal with 
the crisis and to strengthen it. The objective was to ensure funding to the economy 
and safeguard the deposits (República Portuguesa, 2009). In the same period the 
government applied the measures in Appendix Table AII to protect the families 
and the enterprises; these would be followed by an expansionary fiscal policy in 
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2009 described in Appendix Table AIII named Investment and Employment 
Initiative acting in accordance with the EERP. These plans aimed at mitigating 
the pernicious effects of the financial crisis. 
These measures, as expected by the European Commission (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2008), swelled the deficit; by 2010 it reached a 
record of 11.2%.  
In 2010, the Portuguese government announced a program of fiscal 
consolidation (PEC 2010-2013) in line with the new winds from the EU that 
pushed for a tightening of the fiscal policy; while Greek bond yields spiked up 
until it needed international financial assistance, the rest of the periphery of the 
Eurozone suffered with a contagion effect; on May 7 the bailout programme for 
Greece was signed and the peripheric bonds yields rose, the Portuguese were at 
6.285% on the market close (Lourtie, 2011) 
A few days after the Greek bail out was signed, in May 13, to send a calming 
sign to the markets, the Portuguese government announced a lower deficit targets 
for 2010 and 2011; these would be attained by expanding the plan approved two 
months earlier (Lourtie, 2011). 
As markets, European voices and media pressure piled up, a third 
expanded revision of the consolidation plan was announced on September 29. 
A fourth version was prepared but eventually was not approved by the 
Portuguese National Parliament which triggered the announcement of early 
elections; a political crisis was set. The political instability coupled with the 
gloomy Portuguese macroeconomic perspective and the revised deficit and debt 
values (due to methodology change in the Eurostat the figures for 2009 and 2010 
were significantly worse) plunged the debt ratings into non-investment grade 
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(Standard and Poor´s and Fitch); the yields spiked to 8.767% in April 5 (Lourtie 
, 2011). 
Portugal eventually succumbed and requested financial assistance in April 
7, 2011. This financial assistance programme consisted of €52 bn of funding split 
between the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and €26bn from the IMF conditional 
with  the introduction of several economic and fiscal policies reforms agreed in 
the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Conditionality (MoU), 
accompanying the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP); 
which goals were regain access to capital markets and solve the structural 
inefficiencies and deficiencies so Portugal could be en route to a sustainable 
growth path (European Commission, 2016). Some noteworthy reforms targets 
were: 
 Fiscal policy – reduce the deficit/GDP to 3% by 2013 and hence stabilize 
the debt/GDP through the expense and revenue side; 
 Labour market – increase flexibility costs by loosening employment 
protection legislation, decreasing unemployment benefits duration and 
increasing its coverage, wage-setting mechanisms, active labour market 
policies, vocational training and tertiary education;  
 Goods and services markets – increase competition in the transportation, 
energy, telecommunication and postal sectors; dynamize the services 
sector and regulated professions such as real estate, construction, 
accountants, lawyers and pharmacists by removing barriers to the entry. 
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Portugal ended the programme on May 2014 without needing to receive 
the final tranche of €2.5 bn having regained access to the capital markets by 2013 
with a deficit/GDP at 4.5% and long-term bond yield around 3% (European 
Commission, 2016). 
 
3.5-Spain 
Until the prelude of the Financial Crisis in 2007, Spain was in a 
comfortable position, it had been growing for 14 consecutive years, at an average 
annual rate of 3.8% between 2000-2007, the public accounts were in line with 
the Stability and Growth pact, achieving a budget surplus in the years between 
2004 and 2007, while the public debt/GDP was in a downward trajectory, 
decreasing from 58% to 35.6% between 2000 and 2007 (Eurostat). As Spain 
joined the euro area it benefited from low interest rates and the expansionary 
monetary policy which in part explain the long growth period (Marti & Pérez, 
2016) and the seeding of macroeconomic and financial imbalances, such as the 
rise of debt of households and non-financial corporations from 94% to 191% of 
GDP (2000-2007) and the creation of a real estate bubble ; these would 
ultimately become the main transmission mechanism of the crisis (Banco de 
Espanã, 2017). A decreasing competitiveness, caused by high wage growth rates 
and low labour productivity growth, coupled with an increasing demand, 
worsened the current account balance from -4.40 % to 9.63% (Banco de Espanã, 
2017). 
In the wake of the financial crisis Spain fell into a recession by the third 
quarter of 2008 due to decreased liquidity in the global financial system, falling 
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prices of real estate, increased uncertainty  and the decrease in exports caused by 
the reduction in global trade  (Banco de Espanã, 2017; Gruppe & Lange, 2014). 
The magnitude of the exposure of the Spanish credit institutions to the real estate 
sector (sum of mortgage, housing renovations and construction loans) between 
1992 and 2007 increased substantially, from 32.7% to 62%, this made these 
institutions vulnerable to the falling estate prices in the following years (Jimeno 
and Santos, 2014). 
Between 2008-2011 the Spanish Government and Central Bank enacted 
several reforms and measures in order to face the crisis in Spain and to adapt 
international reforms to the country´s financial system (Banco de Espanã, 2017): 
 Creation of the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets (FAFA) to 
provide liquidity to credit institutions and promote lending to the private 
sector; 
 Set up of a system to grant State guarantees to new issues of Spanish credit 
institutions; 
 Increased deposits protection from €20,000 to €100,000, with the 
objective of improving depositors and investors’ confidence;  
 Formation of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector 
(FROB I) do deal with restructuring processes of credit institutions which 
failed in dealing with their difficulties and to reinforce the funds of credit 
institutions undergoing mergers; 
 Circular 3/2010 of Banco de Espana which tightened the provisioning 
requirements for past -due loans; 
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 Reform of the savings bank sector aiming at promoting access to capital 
markets, granting savings banks alternative ways to engage in financial 
activity; 
 Legislation and measures to boost the professionalism of savings banks 
governing bodies; 
 Changes to the Capital requirements in line with the Basel III accord. 
 
Acting accordingly with the EERP, the government of Spain implemented 
a set of temporary fiscal measures that amounted to a fiscal stimulus of 11.2 
billion euro in 2009, i.e. 1% GDP, which together with permanent measures 
namely in the tax system, totaled a fiscal stimulus amount of 2.3% of GDP in 
2009; the aim of these measures was to alleviate the effects of the crisis and its 
social consequences while boosting the economy (Kingdom of Spain, 2009). The 
short-term measures consisted fundamentally of the allocation of public funds, 
in order to create jobs and promote public investment through the Central 
Government Fund for Local Public Investment and Special Central Government 
Fund, which were endowed with 8 and 3 billion euros respectively (Kingdom of 
Spain, 2009). Together with the economic downturn, the delayed impact of the 
tax cut reform (approved before the crisis) and the unwinding of temporary 
revenues, the Spanish fiscal position went from 2% surplus in 2007 to a 11% GDP 
deficit in 2009 (Marti & Pérez, 2016). 
In 2010 the fiscal policy changed abruptly, it went from expansionary to 
contractionary, following the EU guidelines. The focus was diminishing the 
deficit by reducing public spending and tax increases, noteworthy are the VAT 
hike, cut in the public sector compensations, decreased public investment and 
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freezes in the public sector wages and pensions (Banco de Espanã, 2017; Marti & 
Pérez, 2016). 
The declining confidence in Greek debt by the markets spread to several 
other European countries, especially the ones considered to be more vulnerable 
such as Spain due to the worsening of their fiscal position and growth 
perspectives; in accordance the Spanish ten-year sovereign debt spreads over 
Germany increased to 485bp by November 2011 (Banco de Espanã , 2017). 
In June 2012, the Spanish government requested financial assistance from 
the EU to recapitalize part of its banking system; which was unable to do so in the 
capital markets due to worries of the impact of the gloomy economic activity on 
the banks’ balance sheet and the interactions between the sovereign risk and bank 
risk (Banco de Espanã, 2017; Marti & Pérez, 2016 ). This assistance programme 
was approved by the EU in July 2012 and started in December 2012, with the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) granting 41.5bn euro (around 4% of 
Spanish GDP) and ended on January 2014 (Marti & Pérez, 2016). 
 
3.6-Whatever it takes 
The ECB resorted to unconventional monetary policy to tackle the crisis as 
far back as 2009 with the purchase of euro-denominated covered bonds issued in 
the euro area (CBPP) and other programs such as the Securities markets 
programme (SMP) and the Longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs).  
Even with these measures, the sovereign debt crisis spread, in November 
2011 the spreads over Germany peaked at 189 bp in France, 560 bp in Italy, 485 
bp in Spain and 360 bp in Belgium (Banco de Espanã, 2017). 
Nuno Verdial SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN 
17 
 
Between June and July 2012, the Euro area countries adopted several 
measures to address the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. In June the move towards 
a more comprehensive economic and monetary union was taken, the first step 
was the beginning of the establishment of a banking union, starting with the 
creation of a centralized supervisory system, the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
In July, in the same conference, the ECB through Mario Draghi announced 
another programme named Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), consisting 
of buying unlimited amount of sovereign bonds on the secondary markets of 
member states in financial difficulty and stated “Within our mandate, the ECB is 
ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.”  
In September 2014 a third round of CPPP and an asset-backed securities 
purchase programme (ABSPP) were announced, these together with the public 
sector purchase programme (PSPP) would become the Expanded asset purchase 
programme (APP), launched in January 2015 in order to offset the low inflation 
and set it out on the correct path towards 2%. 
The unconventional monetary policy adopted by the ECB had a decisive 
impact in managing the sovereign debt crisis, effectively reducing the sovereign 
bond yields (Afonso & Kazemi, 2018; Afonso & Jalles, 2019; Falagiarda & Reitz, 
2015; Jäger & Grigoriadis, 2017; Pereira, 2016). 
4-Methodology 
In order to model sovereign yield spreads these should be considered as a 
measure of perceived sovereign risk by the markets, which is formed by credit 
risk, liquidity risk and risk appetite (Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010; Beirne & 
Fratzscher, 2013 ; Hauner et al., 2010); together with the intertemporal 
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government budget constraint  and the fundamentals behind it, the determinants 
of the government bond yields can be scrutinized.  
A standard OLS fixed effects panel data model will be used as is common 
in the literature (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013;  Bernoth & Erdogan, 2010 ; Edwards, 
1984; Hauner et al., 2010) on a pool of European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Greece,  Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) to make 
general inferences about the dynamics between government debt yields and the 
fundamentals. Due to Greece distinctive features, this will be performed 
excluding and including this country. In order to account for potential 
endogeneity a 2SLS regression will also be performed, the instrumental variables 
will be the sixth, twelfth, eighteenth and twenty-fourth month lagged 
independent variables. 
A SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions) model will be applied to Portugal 
and Spain to determine specific country relations between the explanatory 
variables and sovereign yields similar to Afonso & Nunes (2015). 
We will model the sovereign bond yields by comparing it to German ones, 
so the dependent variable (ݏ݅,ݐ) will be: 
1) ݏ௜,௧ୀ = ݕ௜,௧ − ݕீ,௧  
where ݏ௜,௧ is the yield spread versus Germany of country i at time t. 
The regression will then take the form: 
2) ݏ௜,௧ୀ = ߙ଴ + ߙ௜ + ߚଵܺ௜,௧ + ൫ߜ଴ + ߜ௜ + ߚଶܺ௜,௧൯ܦ௧஼ + (Ω଴ + Ω௜ + ߚଷܺ௜,௧)ܦ௧௎ + 	 ߝ௜,௧ 
where ߙ଴,ߜ଴ and Ω଴ are constants; ߙ௜,ߜ௜ and Ω௜  are the country-specific 
fixed effects, respectively before crisis, after crisis and after the WIT, ܺ௜,௧ is the 
matrix of explanatory variables and ߚଵ, ߚଶ and ߚଷ are the coefficients. A change in 
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the parameters over time will be possible via the introduction of a dummy 
variable (ܦ௧஼) in the regression as was done in Beirne & Fratzscher (2013), this 
dummy will take the value of one for the period after the fall of Lehman Brothers, 
September 2008. This model is expanded by adding another dummy variable 
(ܦ௧௎) which will take the value of one after July 2012, this was the month of the 
WIT speech of Mario Draghi. These two dummy variables will allow us to check 
if and how the markets perception and risk pricing of the sovereign bonds 
changed after these two events. Evidences of a bond pricing regime change after 
the WIT and the OMT announcement were already found by Afonso et al. (2018) 
with a time-varying parameter panel;  this regime is characterized by a weaker 
link between the fundamentals and the spreads but with higher spreads 
compared to the pre-crisis period. 
The below preliminary analysis was done to verify the time series 
properties of our data, the test statistics for Hausman, Modified Wald and 
Wooldridge tests are reported in the Table I and Table II and Im-Pesaran-Shin 
unit root in the Appendix Table AVI 
1. Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test displayed the non-stationarity in levels of 
REER,  
3-month Euribor and Debt/GDP, which lead us to first differentiate these 
variables in order to obtain stationarity 
2. Hausman test, which confirms the fixed effects model is better suited 
3. Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, corroborates our 
suspicion of the presence of heteroskedasticity  
4. Wooldridge test shows there is autocorrelation 
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To account for the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation we used Newey West 
standard errors. 
5-Empirical Analysis 
5.1-Data 
The timeframe will be 1999:11-2019:6, this will allow to capture the last 
years of the great moderation period, the financial and economic crisis, the 
sovereign debt crisis and unconventional monetary policy. The starting date 1999 
was chosen because it is the year of the introduction of the €. 
In line with previous literature the variables will be public debt/GDP, fiscal 
balance/GDP (Fiscal), real effective exchange rate (REER), the Chicago Board of 
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), bond yield bid ask spread (BAS) and the 3-
month Euribor rate. The debt and fiscal balance, which are a measure of the credit 
risk, were taken from the European Commission forecasts, this allows to integrate 
the forward-looking expectations of investors which rely on these reports as a 
source of information (Attinasi et al, 2009; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; 
Gerlach et al., 2010). Since the forecasts are (generally) published at a 
semiannual frequency and we are using monthly data, for the months between 
each forecast we used the last forecast available. These two variables are used in 
the regression as the respective spread against Germany. We expect the debt ratio 
to have a positive sign, as the stock of government debt increases compared to its 
GDP, so does the risk and accordingly, the yields spreads. Higher values of the 
fiscal balance ratio imply a healthy budget balance and so the coefficient for this 
determinant is expected to be negative. As in Afonso & Kazemi (2018) and 
Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2012) we expect the REER to be positive, so a currency 
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appreciation increases the spreads. The VIX will be used as a measure of risk 
appetite; the daily data was transformed to monthly by averaging it; as markets 
tensions and volatility increase so should the yield spreads. To introduce a 
measure of liquidity risk we used the BAS, this parameter should display a 
positive sign; higher values of BAS means the bond is less liquid and hence higher 
spreads. 
The 3-month Euribor is introduced to proxy the monetary policy of the 
ECB and we anticipate it to be positive as in Afonso & Silva (2017), as the ECB 
monetary policy becomes more accommodative, yield spreads should decrease.  
The sources and descriptive statistics are displayed in the Appendix Table AIV 
and Table AV. 
As it can be observed in Figure 2, the Spanish and Portuguese bond yields 
spread began raising after the 2007-2008 financial crisis; from 2010 onward, the 
onset of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, both countries yield spread raised 
even more sharply, especially the Portuguese one. This trend would only be 
reversed by 2012.  
Figure 2 – 10-year government bond yield spreads versus Germany 
 
                         Source: Eurostat and own calculations 
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Figures 3 and 4, show the debt ratio and the fiscal balance spreads were 
stable in the Portuguese case and improving in Spain, the latter debt ratio was in 
downward trajectory and the budget balance was positive. This trend would 
change after 2008, with both countries running higher deficits and increasing 
their debt ratios.  
Figure 3 – Debt/GDP spread versus Germany forecast 
 
            Source: European Commission and own calculations 
 
Figure 4 – Fiscal balance/GDP spread versus Germany forecast 
 
            Source: European Commission and own calculations 
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The liquidity of the government bonds of both countries decreased after 
the Eurozone crisis, but was much more pronounced in Portugal as seen in Figure 
5. 
Figure 5 –Yield bid ask spread of 10-year government bond 
 
            Source: Bloomberg and own calculations 
 
Two trends are visible regarding the REER in Figure 6, until 2008 an 
increase trajectory, followed by a decrease not as steep as the previous trend. 
Figure 6 – Real effective exchange rate 
 
           Source: International Financial Statistics 
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
1,40
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Portugal Spain
80,00
85,00
90,00
95,00
100,00
105,00
110,00
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Portugal Spain
Nuno Verdial SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN 
24 
 
 
The decreasing trajectory of the Euribor rates after 2008, as seen in Figure 
7, illustrates the accommodative monetary policy adopted by the ECB. 
Figure 7– Euribor rates 
 
           Source: Eurostat 
 
The spike in the VIX in 2008, following the fall of Lehman Brothers, and 
higher volatility after the crisis, when compared to the period 2003 – 2007 can 
be seen in Figure 8.           
Figure 8– VIX index 
 
            Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data and own calculations 
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5.2-Baseline 
First, we will analyze the results of the OLS/2SLS fixed effects (FE) model 
on a pool of European Countries, with Greece and excluding it, presented in Table 
I and Table II respectively. The SUR regression results are discussed afterwards. 
In both regressions without the dummies (1 and 3), only the fiscal balance 
and BAS are statistically significant, and both are associated with their 
anticipated sign, negative and positive accordingly but the coefficients are 
substantially greater in the 2SLS regression. It should be noted that besides the 
VIX, all the other variables, while statistically insignificant have an unanticipated 
sign.  
Regarding the regressions 2 and 4, before the crisis their determinants 
differ; while in the OLS regression the debt ratio, the fiscal balance and the BAS 
are significant, in the 2SlS solely the fiscal balance is significant. Only the debt 
ratio has the expected sign (positive), hence markets were mispricing the other 
two and not pricing the other variables. 
After the crisis and until WIT the fiscal balance and the VIX change are 
statistically significant, both display the “correct” sign, negative and positive 
respectively. These regressions display different results for the other 
determinants, BAS is significant in OLS while REER and Euribor are significant 
in the 2SLS, all with the expected signals. The debt ratio is not significant and 
exhibits an unexpected negative sign. 
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Table I 
Determinants of bond yield spreads with Greece 
 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 2SLS (4) 2SLS 
Pre crisis     
Δ Debt/GDP -0.022 0.014* -0.029 0.029 
 (0.041) (0.008) (0.066) (0.029) 
Fiscal balance/GDP -0.255*** 0.100*** -0.105*** 0.161*** 
 (0.052) (0.035) 0.027 0.032 
VIX 0.0003 -0.009 -0.006   -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.016 (0.007) 
BAS 5.766*** -19.383*   13.886*** -3.635 
 (1.409) (10.430) (0.569)   (12.653) 
 ΔREER -0.045 -0.015 -0.3339   0.009 
 (0.037) (0.024) (0.281) (0.129)   
 Δ 3-Month Euribor -0.498 0.077 2.199 0.097 
 (0.360) (0.246)   (1.490) (0.433) 
After crisis     
Δ Debt/GDP  -0.084  -0.006   
  (0.087)  (0.152) 
Fiscal balance/GDP  -0.529***  -0.377*** 
  (0.123)  (0.096) 
VIX  0.025***    0.049*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009) 
BAS  24.244**  11.415 
  (10.369)    (12.637)   
ΔREER  0.139  0.328* 
  (0.085)  (0.188) 
Δ3-Month Euribor  0.751    2.015** 
  (0.506)  (0.942) 
After WIT     
Δ Debt/GDP  0.093  -0.009 
  (0.095)  (0.156) 
Fiscal balance/GDP  0.307**  0.079 
  (0.121)  (0.084) 
VIX  -0.007  -0.027** 
  (0.016)  (0.013) 
BAS  15.991***  19.299*** 
  (2.422)  (1.952) 
ΔREER  -0.176*  -0.588**  
  (0.097)  (0.266) 
Δ 3-Month Euribor  -1.361  -0.711   
  (2.443)  (4.465)   
R2 0.666 0.812 0.4984      0.723   
No. of Observations 2350 2350 2290      2290 
Hausman  1435.8*** 
Modified Wald 24346.23*** 
Wooldridge 180.645*** 
 
             Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
             The standard errors are reported between parentheses. 
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From the WIT onward, in the OLS regression the fiscal balance pricing is 
changed again, since it is statistically significant but becomes less negative. In 
2SLS the change in the VIX is significant and is negative. The REER is significant 
and has a negative sign in OLS and 2SLS. The BAS coefficient is also modified 
and becomes greater in both cases.  
 
5.3-Excluding Greece 
The OLS and 2SLS specifications without the dummies are similar to the 
ones in the previous section except for the debt ratio; now reveals a positive sign 
and is significant in the latter version. 
As for regressions 6 and 8, in the pre-crisis period the fiscal ratio is positive 
and significant as in the version including Greece (see Table II). In 2SLS the 
Euribor rate is also significant and positive. 
For both regressions in the intermediate period, the change for all the 
determinants are statistically significant and have the expected sign except the 
Euribor in 2SLS, which also has the expected positive sign but is not significant. 
In the last period, in the 2SLS specification the VIX is the sole statistically 
significant regressor, displaying a negative sign. 
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Table II 
Determinants of bond yield spreads without Greece 
 
 (5) OLS (6) OLS (7) 2SLS (8) 2SLS 
Pre crisis     
Δ Debt/GDP 0.025 0.008* 0.100** 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.004) (0.043) (0.014) 
Fiscal balance/GDP -0.141*** 0.063** -0.154*** 0.144*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.010) (0.016) 
VIX 0.004 -0.003 0.008 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (-0.004) 
BAS 12.435*** -7.914 13.514*** -5.904 
 (0.957) (8.040) (0.863) (6.864) 
ΔREER -0.030 -0.015 0.104 0.0561 
 (0.0197) (0.009) (0.097) (0.085) 
Δ 3-Month Euribor -0.307 0.038 0.140 0.494* 
 (0.186) (0.164) (0.512) (0.281) 
After crisis     
Δ Debt/GDP  0.045*  0.119** 
  (0.026)  (0.051) 
Fiscal balance/GDP  -0.258***  -0.334*** 
  (0.042)  0.029) 
VIX  0.018***  0.030*** 
  (0.005)  (0.007) 
BAS  19.307**  17.956** 
  (8.006)  (6.986) 
ΔREER  0.0528*  0.206* 
  (0.040)  (0.112) 
Δ3-Month Euribor  0.457*  0.202 
  (0.258)  (0.396) 
After WIT     
Δ Debt/GDP  -.0169  -0.089 
  (0.030)  (0.060) 
Fiscal balance/GDP  0.0026  0.0204 
  (0.064)  (0.031) 
VIX  -0.010  -0.015*** 
  (0.009)  (0.005) 
BAS  0.760  2.085 
  (4.445)  (2.134) 
ΔREER  -0.012  -0.0941 
  (0.055)  0.130 
Δ 3-Month Euribor  -3.543  -2.410 
  (2.336)  (2.760) 
R2 0.771 0.821 0.69 0.75 
No. of Observations 2115 2115 2059 2059 
Hausman 2765.96*** 
Modified Wald 4384.76*** 
Wooldridge 629.204*** 
              
             Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
             The standard errors are reported between parentheses. 
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5.4-SUR 
The fiscal balance for Portugal and Spain before the crisis displays a 
statistically significant mispricing since it has a positive sign (see Table III). In 
Spain the VIX and the BAS are also significant and have a positive sign, while in 
Portugal only the latter is significant but has a negative sign which points to the 
Portuguese yield spread vis a vis Germany decreasing in times of increased 
volatility. This implies a market perception of the Portuguese debt as a safe 
heaven and at least as safe as the German one during this time period. 
After the financial crisis, in both countries, the fiscal balance is again 
statistically significant, but the sign becomes negative, illustrating the markets 
new attention to this economic fundamental and the underlying credit risk linked 
to this variable. For Portugal the VIX and the BAS become statistically significant 
and positive, exhibiting the perspective change for the Portuguese debt, as 
volatility increases, so does the spread vis a vis Germany and the liquidity risk 
begins being priced as well, with a lower liquidity (higher BAS) meaning higher 
yields spreads. 
The results after WIT are puzzling for Spain, the fiscal balance coefficient 
becomes more negative, implying an increased sensitivity to higher projected 
deficits compared to the previous period and the monetary policy proxy is 
significant for the first time, while displaying an unexpected negative sign, 
contradicting the theory, with lower Euribor rates the spreads should diminish. 
As for Portugal only the BAS is statistically significant with a positive sign; this 
shows the ever-increasing importance of the liquidity in the pricing of sovereign 
risk. 
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Table III 
Determinants of bond yields spread using SUR 
 
 Portugal Spain 
Pre crisis   
Δ Debt/GDP -0.0098 0.0079 
 (0.0565) (0.0328) 
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.0828* 0.0882** 
 (0.0495) (0.0314) 
VIX -0.0175** 0.0101* 
 (0.0087) (0.0060) 
BAS -5.4838 33.9778*** 
 (8.4252) (12.8658) 
 ΔREER 0.0118 -0.0242 
 (0.1224) (0.07029) 
 Δ 3-Month Euribor -0.1055 0.1121 
 (0.5392) (0.3051) 
After crisis   
Δ Debt/GDP 0.0424 0.0081 
 (0.0643) (0.0392) 
Fiscal balance/GDP -0.4218*** -0.3045*** 
 (0.0944) (0.0587) 
VIX 0.2558*** 0.0075 
 (0.0093) (0.0062) 
BAS 16.1129* 15.9797 
 (8.4305) (13.1852) 
ΔREER 0.1151 0.0318 
 (0.1962) (0.1024) 
Δ3-Month Euribor 1.1048 0.6629 
 (0.7406) (0.4101) 
After WIT   
Δ Debt/GDP -0.0440 0.0310 
 (0.0673) (0.0303) 
Fiscal balance/GDP -0.0160 -0.0830** 
 (0.1145) (0.0381) 
VIX -0.0186 -0.0057 
 (0.0161) (0.0088) 
BAS 5.7714*** -5.6343 
 (1.1803) (4.5295) 
ΔREER -0.1102 0.0531 
 (0.2124) (0.1004) 
Δ 3-Month Euribor -2.8577 -3.2804** 
 (2.8851) (1.6191) 
R2 0.9389 0.8987 
No. of Observations 235 
                                  Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
                                  The standard errors are reported between parentheses. 
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6-Conclusion 
The objective of this dissertation was to study how the pricing of 
Portuguese and Spanish sovereign risk by the markets was affected by the 
financial and subsequent sovereign debt crisis and with the advent of the 
unconventional monetary policy. This was done by investigating how the 
determinants of the sovereign bond yields behaved between 1999 and 2019. 
In order to have a comparison point we first examined the problem at the 
Eurozone level and then proceeded to investigate the Portuguese and Spanish 
case. 
As we suspected, after the financial crisis the markets began pricing 
correctly all the components of the sovereign risk, this is patent in the change to 
the expected signs of the fiscal position (credit risk), the BAS (liquidity risk) and 
the VIX (risk appetite). This is coherent with the hypothesis that the financial 
markets were not reflecting the true risk of Eurozone sovereign bonds after the 
introduction of the Euro until the crisis and became more sensitive after it. 
After the WIT, the results are weaker than expected, but still display the 
dissipation of the tensions over the economic fundamentals of the Eurozone 
countries in the increase of the overall coefficient for the fiscal balance, while 
remaining negative, which is the theoretical correct sign. 
The idiosyncrasies of Greece are unfolded when we compare the model 
with this sovereign state to the version without it. While the wake-up call after 
the crisis can be seen in all its strength in the version without Greece, only when 
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including this sovereign state, were we able to see a change in the yields spreads 
after the WIT.  
The SUR regression shows the markets perception change for Portugal and 
Spain, regarding the credit risk, was focused on the fiscal balance. The fiscal 
balance coefficient change is smaller when compared to the results of the full 
Eurozone panel but when compared to the panel without Greece, the Portuguese 
one is greater, while the Spanish one is between the OLS and the 2SLS result. 
Portugal was one of the most affected countries by the sovereign debt crisis, so 
this result is not surprising. The only pricing changes for Spain in the SUR 
regression are the fiscal balance and an odd result for the Euribor after the WIT; 
this shows the markets pricing change of our selected variables might not be as 
suited for the Spanish as it was for Portugal and other Eurozone countries. The 
non-statistically significance of Spanish debt/GDP might be a result of the years 
prior to crisis, in which its levels were lower than Germany. 
Our results show that the Eurozone sovereign bonds pricing was changed, 
with an increase in the price of sovereign risk across all its factors and a 
subsequent decrease after the WIT.  As for Portugal, there is a more pronounced 
increase in the price of sovereign risk.  
We did not find evidence of a dissipation of the tensions after WIT in 
neither Portugal nor Spain, in fact the liquidity (BAS) and credit risk (Fiscal 
balance/GDP) pricing increased in these countries respectively. This might be 
due to the model limitation, a more dynamic approach, such as a time varying 
coefficients model, allowing the coefficients to change across time instead of at 
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specific moments in time, could provide different findings for these countries and 
hence constitutes a pertinent follow up to this study. 
Future research on this topic will benefit from the increased number of the 
observations after these events and will be able to explore the long-term 
implications of the pricing of sovereign risk after these events. 
While our findings and model cannot explain in full detail and without a 
doubt the dynamics of the price of sovereign risk in the last years, they do present 
a picture and help understand what happened; in the words of Box (1979), “For 
such a model there is no need to ask the question "Is the model true?". If "truth" 
is to be the "whole truth" the answer must be "No". The only question of interest 
is "Is the model illuminating and useful?" “ 
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Appendix 
Table AI 
IREF Measures Description  
Measure Description 
Strengthening the Information Disclosure and 
Transparency Obligations of Financial 
Institutions (FI) 
I)FI must provide more information to 
supervisory authorities, namely the exposure 
level to different types of financial 
instruments, risk management, control 
practices, held shares of corporations 
registered outside of the European union;  
II) widening of the liability of legal persons; 
III) strengthen the competences of National 
Financial Supervisors Council 
Revising the Punishments in the Financial 
Sector 
Updating the framework of penal and 
administrative sanctions including increases 
in fines and introduction of accelerated 
summary processes in the banking and 
insurance sector 
Strengthening the Deposits Guarantee Raised from EUR 25 000 to EUR 100 000 
Granting of guarantees by the State 
Creation of a State guarantee mechanism to 
ensure the access of funding to credit 
institutions, registered in Portugal and 
complying with the solvency criteria, unable 
to finance/refinance their activities due to 
liquidity constrains in the financial markets  
Strengthening the Financial Soundness of 
Credit Institutions 
Introduction of a framework allowing direct 
public intervention in the financial 
restructuring and recovery of credit 
institutions with a core capital levels below 
the legal minimum 
Other Isolated Interventions to Assure 
Financial Stability 
To guarantee the stability of the Portuguese 
financial system the government: 
I) nationalized Banco Português de Negócios, 
S.A. (BPN)  
II) granted State guarantees to Banco Privado 
Português, S.A. (BPP) 
Source : Adapted from República Portuguesa, 2009 
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Table AII 
Measures to Support Households and Businesses in 2008 
Objective Description 
Support owners and leasers of real estate 
I)Reduction of Municipal Real Estate Tax 
(IMI) and extension of period of exemption 
II) Introduction of a regressive loading of the 
personal income tax deductions vis-à-vis 
housing costs 
III)Creation of a special scheme applicable for 
funds and corporations renting housing 
IV)Increased tax saving on the sale of the own 
and permanent dwelling 
Fight poverty 
Expand, strengthen and reinforce the 
Solidarity Supplement for the Elderly and the 
Social Integration Income 
Household protection 
I)Increase amount and beneficiaries of School 
Welfare 
II) Raise Family Allowance 
III)Implementation of a transport pass for 
young people 
Business support 
I)Introduction of a general tax bracket with a 
reduced corporate tax rate 
II)Reduction of advance payments by small 
and medium sized enterprises (SME) 
III)Creation of a mechanism enabling the 
advance payment of EU funds granted to 
businesses 
IV)Constitution of credit lines targeted to the 
SME with improved financing conditions to 
promote corporate investment 
V)Implementation of the Programme for the 
Extraordinary Settlement of the States’ Debts 
Source : Adapted from República Portuguesa, 2009 
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Table AIII 
Investment and Employment Initiative 
Measure Description 
Modernisation of schools 
Reconstruction and modernization of over 
100 public schools between 2009-2001 
Fostering Renewable Energies, Energy 
Efficiency and Energy Transmission 
Infrastructure 
I) Installation of solar panels and micro-
generation units (mini-wind turbines) 
II) Investment in energy transmission 
infrastructure 
III) Improvement of energy efficiency of 
public buildings 
IV) Investment in energy metering networks 
Modernisation of Technological 
Infrastructure – New Generation Broadband 
Networks 
Support for carrying out investments in next 
generation broadband networks 
Special support for economic activity, exports 
and SME 
I)SME credit lines with partial subsidization 
of the interest rate and full subsidization of 
the guarantee fee 
II)Creation of a fund of EUR 175 million to 
co-finance domestic and international 
mergers and acquisitions operations 
III)Support national SME trade transactions 
in external markets by providing additional 
credit risk coverage 
IV)Support to activities promoting the 
country abroad 
V) Support to private investment projects in 
agriculture and agro-industry 
VI) Creation of a credit facility supporting 
agriculture and agro-industry exports and 
competitiveness 
VII) Tax credits for investment 
VIII)VAT Reverse-charge in the provision of 
goods and services to Public Administration 
IX) Reduction to the VAT reimbursement 
threshold 
X) Reduction to the advance tax payment 
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Protecting employment and strengthening 
social protection 
I) Reduce the employer’s contribution to 
Social Security by 3% for workers older than 
45 years 
II) Support for enterprises and workers in 
case of a temporary reduction of activity 
III) creation of traineeships for young people 
IV) support the return to work of the 
unemployed, particularly the long-term 
unemployed and the unemployed aged over 
55 years 
V) Expansion of social protection by 
temporarily extending unemployment 
benefits 
 
Source: Adapted from República Portuguesa, 2009 
 
 
Table AIV  
Data set 
Variable Source 
ݏ௜,௧  Eurostat and own calculations 
Debt/GDP European Commission and own calculations 
Fiscal Balance European Commission and own calculations 
BAS Bloomberg and own calculations 
REER International Financial Statistics 
VIX Federal Reserve Economic Data and own calculations 
3-Month Euribor Eurostat 
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Table AV  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
ݏ௜ ,௧ 2360 1.167 2.456 
Δ Debt/GDP 2350 0.121 2.287 
Fiscal Balance 2360 -0.783 2.853 
BAS 2360 0.042 0.230 
Δ REER 2360 0.004 0.725 
VIX 2360 19.638 8.190 
Δ 3-Month Euribor 2350 -0.0160 0.144 
 
 
Table AVI 
Stationarity Test Results IM-Pesaran-Shin 
Variable Test statistic p-value Order 
ݏ௜ ,௧ -2.0069 0.0224 I(0) 
Debt/GDP -19.3374 0.0000 I(1) 
Fiscal Balance -1.8985 0.0288 I(0) 
BAS -4.8455 0.0000 I(0) 
REER -19.4816 0.0000 I(1) 
VIX -6.3806 0.0000 I(0) 
3-Month Euribor -12.4551 0.0000 I(1) 
I(O) and I(I) means in levels and in first differences respectively 
 
